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Autocracies at Critical Junctures: 
A Model for the Study of Dictatorial Regimes
by Wolfgang Merkel and Johannes Gerschewski*
How can authoritarianism in an age of democratisation survive? 
What are the critical junctures when a dictatorship becomes less 
stable and potentially fails? Three pillars of stability of autocratic 
rule are identified: legitimacy, co-optation, and repression. Referring 
to historical institutionalism’s key concept of critical juncture, the 
hypothesis is based on the observation that these junctures become 
regime threatening when a serious crisis in one pillar occurs and the 
two other pillars can no longer sufficiently compensate this instability.
We know much about democracies and the democ-
ratisation of political systems. Even though there 
is no such thing as the theory of democracy, we can 
certainly speak of particular democratic theories: 
theories of representative, direct, deliberative, defect, 
partial, presidential or parliamentarian democracies. 
These individual theories cannot always claim to be 
fully sound; however, we do know significantly more 
about democracies than about autocratic regimes, 
both theoretically and empirically. Our present under-
standing of autocracies, we owe to Hanna Arendt, Carl 
J. Friedrich, Ernst Nolte, Giovanni Sartori or Juan Linz, 
to name only a few. In the 20 th century, they explicitly 
conducted research on dictatorships.
What is even more noteworthy, as we are dealing with 
dictatorships as a form of rule, is that such regimes 
managed to prevail as a vicious reality of the 21st 
century. Increasing amounts of historical and politi-
cal research in recent years foretold not only of the 
decline of the great, third wave of democratisation 
(or at least a “democratic rollback” as Larry Diamond 
*  Article originally published in German in: WZB Mitteilungen, 
Vol. 133, September 2011, pp. 21-24. English translation  
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anticipated), but even the “return of authoritarian 
powers” as predicted by Azar Gat. For the past four 
years Freedom House has recorded the slight, but con-
tinuous decline of democratic standards worldwide. 
By the end of 2010, it evaluated 42 governments world-
wide as “not free,” but rather as open dictatorships.
In addition, research on the external promotion of 
democracy has produced rather sobering results. 
Econometric and statistical analyses could not show 
any significant impact of the external promotion 
of democracy on the chances for democratisation 
in respective countries. China, Vietnam, Singapore, 
Russia, Iran, and Venezuela demonstrate that the 
struggle against autocratic systems has never really 
been won. Not only have dictatorial regimes survived 
the struggle, but they also have managed to become 
a magnet of economic prosperity and a role model of 
political order in a regional context. Whether the most 
recent events in the Arab world can trigger substantial 
change is yet to be seen; therefore, some scepticism is 
warranted.
A systematic, analytic approach to the study of dicta-
torial regimes is characteristic of the recent research, 
which is distinct from the rather descriptive research 
on totalitarianism and authoritarianism conducted 
between the 1950s and 1970s. Instead, recent research 
efforts use methods of political science to conduct 
comparative analyses with a number of cases, seeking 
general theoretical claims. 
The present study of political regimes is about “big 
questions”, as stated by Barbara Geddes in 1999. It 
is for precisely this reason that there is an epistemo-
logical rift in the field separating the micro and the 
macro perspectives. At present, the action-theoretical 
observations from the micro perspective dominate 
the field of research once again. By modelling game-
theory interaction processes within ruling elites, 
Geddes showed that “One-Party-Regimes” with an 
average lifespan of 23 years are more stable than 
“Personalistic Regimes” (15.1 years) and “Military 
Regimes” (8.8 years). Military regimes are often faced 
with the dilemma to either secure integration of the 
armed forces or to ensure political rule by means of a 
military dictatorship, sometimes outside the normal 
chain of command.
Other regimes, especially One-Party-Regimes, are 
better protected from such conflicts because they 
can rely on institutionalised mechanisms of conflict. 
However, the question of succession has proven to be 
the Achilles heel of Personalistic Regimes. The latter 
lacks legitimate means and reduces the contingency 
of poorly formalised, dynastic or quasi-dynastic 
inheritance claims. In contrast to the mostly ideologi-
cal One-Party-Regimes, Personalistic and Military 
Regimes can only rely on ideological loyalty. 
As important as the insights (provided by game theory 
inspired explanations) are, the question remains: how 
can micro-based explanations alone account for the 
macro phenomenon of regime stability? What is nec-
essary for connecting micro-to-macro theoretical ele-
ments? Such a middle-range approach is analytically 
more fruitful to answer big questions rather than 
macro-inspired correlation analysis or game theory 
models. A theoretical framework for such synthesis 
is provided by historical institutionalism, which has 
been gradually developed since the mid-1990s. As 
the most recent modification of neo-liberal institu-
tionalism, historical institutionalism permits the 
following analytical operations: it is able to connect 
structures with actors in a useful manner; it is a suit-
able framework for both quantitative and qualitative 
comparisons; and it is capable to explain continuity 
as well as change. 
Institutions via opportunity structures filter politi-
cal actions. They structure action incentives and 
influence the preferences, coalitions and strategies 
of actors. Once established, institutions develop self-
reinforcing tendencies: Interests are formed and cer-
tainties of expectations and calculations are evolved. 
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But single questions do not constitute an academic 
research approach, even if they are analytically 
appropriate. Rather, it is necessary to recognize their 
interdependence and to develop a research framework 
with the synthesis imperative of structure and action 
at its core. This is presented here as a “Three-Pillar-
Model”.
Dictatorial regimes base their rule principally on three 
pillars: legitimacy, repression and co-optation. Legiti-
macy has essentially two foundations: one that is 
normative-ideological and one related to performance. 
Anti-liberalism, anti-parliamentarianism, racism, 
nationalism, law and order, religious-anachronistic 
orders of salvation, and Marxist-Leninist future 
designs are at least temporarily capable of creating a 
normative approval amongst those who are subjected 
to the rule. However, fascist and communist ideolo-
gies have lost their normative persuasiveness. If any-
thing, the political Islam and its variants are able to 
develop an ideological cohesiveness within autocratic 
regimes. However, since the restriction of fundamen-
tal human rights is a principle of their claim to power, 
the promises of their salvation runs the risk of drying 
out within the repressive reality. Also because dictato-
rial regimes are in principle less stable, they are also 
more dependent on their performance in the field of 
economy as well as security and order. 
It is undisputed that autocracies are primarily based 
on repression. There are many attempts to highlight 
repression as the defining feature of autocratic rule. 
This becomes particularly evident in Hanna Arendt’s 
study on “Elements and Origins of Total Rule”. 
Repression occurs in different forms and levels of 
intensity. One can distinguish between “soft” and 
“hard” repression, albeit transition between the two is 
rather fluid. While soft repression focuses primarily 
on the restriction of political rights such as freedom 
of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of press, 
hard repression mainly targets at the core of human 
rights such as physical integrity and individual free-
dom. It can be proven empirically that autocracies react 
to threats of the status quo with increased repression. 
However, the impact of repression on the suppression 
Actors want “investments” in the strategic orientation 
of such institutions to amortise. Thus, institutional 
paths develop, which become considerably consoli-
dated. Path dependencies evolve, which can prevail 
even during the rise of more efficient institutional 
alternatives.
Paths can also end or be altered: especially as a 
consequence of critical junctures. In the research 
of regimes, critical junctures can be interpreted as 
drastic situations of accumulated crises. During such 
times, the ability of institutions to shape behaviour 
normatively condenses, and thus, actors receive a 
broader scope of action. The usually extensive conse-
quences of decisions made can then trigger new path 
dependencies. At critical junctures, the regime itself 
is at stake. The outcomes are by no means predictable. 
They are highly dependent on the decisions and the 
behaviour of the relevant elites. Thus, outcomes are 
rather contingent: whether a critical juncture leads 
to a democracy or a hybrid regime, whether it just 
causes a change within the governing coalition or 
the political leadership and the old elites are able to 
re-establish an autocratic balance. Poland after 1990, 
the Soviet Union and Russia after 1993 or China after 
1989 and Iran after 2009 demonstrate the spectrum 
of dissimilar forms of regimes that have evolved from 
critical junctures. The result of this development 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other Arabic countries 
remains entirely open. 
In order to explain the big question of the survival 
or demise of dictatorial regimes, the following 
three problems must be solved: Which mechanisms 
explicate the reproduction of autocratic rule? What 
explains the emergence of critical junctures? How do 
autocratic rulers react at critical junctures?
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of protest remains uncertain and is highly dependent 
on the context. Research shows both a positive and 
a negative relation between repression of the state 
and protest against the state. Repression alone can-
not stabilise a system permanently. The related losses 
of legitimacy are usually high: as the repression 
increases, the legitimacy decreases, and vice versa.
The third pillar of rule is co-optation. The selective 
use of co-optation enables the autocratic ruling elites 
to tie important actors and groups from outside the 
original regime core to the dictatorship so that they 
do not employ their resources against the regime. 
Those strategically important actors consist mainly 
of economic elites, the security apparatus and the 
military. Political offices and privileges as well as 
economic resources are the common exchanges of 
“political rent”. Corruption, clientelism and the estab-
lishment of patrimonial networks are equally wide-
spread. On one hand, the autocratic regime elite has 
to gain the support of relevant actors for the regime 
while also ensuring that none of the actors accumu-
lates too much power. The availability of resources 
constrains the extent of such purchased collaboration 
for the regime. In general, oil-exporting rentier states 
regulate most of the resources.
The three-pillar-model has a heuristic advantage. It 
makes it possible to systematically localise the trig-
gers of crisis phenomena. One can assume that frac-
tures in one pillar can be temporarily compensated for 
by the consolidation of the other pillars. At the same 
time, cracks in one pillar can overload the  others and 
thus lead to a general collapse. However, the higher 
the institutionalisation within one pillar and the 
more appropriate the balance between the pillars, 
the more stable the respective authoritarian system. 
The ideal equilibrium for the survival of autocracies 
is likely to be where legitimacy is as high as possible, 
hard repression as low as possible and co-optation 
at average. This conserves resources, minimises the 
unintended consequences and thus stabilises the 
system.
The three-pillar-model is not yet a theory. However, it 
provides a theoretical shelter for description without 
explanatory power. It also provides a heuristic frame-
work, which can make the origins of stability and 
instability of very different systems of dictatorial rule 
not only comparable, but also explicable.
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